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Abstract
In a general equilibrium framework, it is known that imitation may actually promote innova-
tion (Aghion et al., 1997). The same effect is demonstrated with a standard oligopoly model in
which one firm has the ability to develop technologies while all other firms imitate and obtain a
fraction of it for free. Competition is shown to dampen innovation, while imitation may stimulate
it if imitation is strong and competition moderate. The findings have implications for policy to-
ward intellectual property rights protection, as weak protection may promote rather than impede
technology innovation.
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1 Introduction
Endogenous growth theory regards technological innovation as the engine of
economic growth. Since a firm’s innovations may be imitated by other firms,
an important question is whether imitation will hinder or strengthen the incen-
tive to innovate. One argument, which can be traced to Schumpeter, is that
imitation reduces the reward for developing new technologies and therefore
must dampen innovation. However, another argument, commonly attributed
to Arrow (1962), is that the effect is not so clear. Imitation (or more gener-
ally, product market competition) reduces a firm’s profit if it does not innovate.
Thus, imitation may serve as a “stick” in stimulating innovation.
Aghion et al. (1997) demonstrated that indeed such a stimulation may pre-
vail and, as a result, imitation can be growth-enhancing. They suggest that the
incentive to innovate is related to the difference between a firm’s pre-innovation
and anticipated post-innovation profits. When imitation is stronger, a firm’s
profits are reduced both before and after any innovation. If the pre-innovation
profits are reduced more than the post-innovation profits, the difference will
rise and, as a result, the firm may engage in more innovation. Intuitive and
powerful as the argument is, alone it is not enough to generate Aghion et al.’s
anticipated result because, in that model, any single firm’s innovation is still
reduced by imitation. The positive effect of imitation on growth is through
a “composition effect”–imitation pushes more industries into neck-and-neck
competition, which generates more innovation activity than when one firm in
an industry is lagging behind the other. In other words, imitation stimulates
innovation only in a general equilibrium framework. One wonders whether
such an effect can be found in a partial equilibrium framework. This study
applied a standard industrial organization model in an attempt to show that
indeed imitation may stimulate innovation.
In the model, several firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in
Cournot competition. Firms’ costs can be reduced by technologies developed
before they compete in the product market. Only one firm has the ability
to innovate; all the other firms are imitators. Innovation is modeled as de-
veloping a technology at some cost, while imitators obtain some fraction of
the innovator’s technology for free. In a two-stage game, the innovator first
chooses the level of technology, which is imitated by its competitors instantly.
Then all firms engage in Cournot competition in the product market. The
study investigates how the technology chosen by the innovator is affected by
the intensity of imitation and competition.
In choosing its technology level, the innovator faces the following tradeoff.
A more advanced technology reduces its own cost, which is beneficial. This
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is the direct effect. Due to imitation, however, the technology also reduces
its competitors’ costs, which is detrimental to the innovator. This is the indi-
rect effect. The optimal level of technology therefore balances the two effects
against the cost of developing technologies.
As imitation becomes stronger, the direct effect is weakened because im-
itators are now stronger and therefore more aggressive in competition. The
residual demand faced by the innovator becomes smaller, reducing his mar-
ginal benefit from any cost reduction. The indirect effect, on the other hand,
may be strengthened or weakened by stronger imitation, depending on the
current level of imitation. When imitation is already strong, further strength-
ening imitation will weaken the indirect effect both because the technology
reduces imitators’ costs at a decreasing rate, and because imitators’ strength
reduces the innovator’s profit at a decreasing rate. It is possible that the weak-
ening of the indirect effect might outweigh the weakening of the direct effect,
leading the innovator to choose a higher level of technology when imitation is
stronger. This happens when imitation is already strong and competition (as
measured by the number of imitators) is moderate. The impact of competi-
tion has been analyzed in a similar way, and the conclusion is that competition
always dampens innovation.
Investigating how imitation affects innovation is important because it has
policy implications about intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. The
conventional wisdom is that innovators’ profits must be protected, usually
through a legal monopoly, for them to have enough incentive to develop tech-
nologies. In such a world, imitation discourages innovation because it reduces
its rewards, hence the rationale for enforcing IPR. This view has been chal-
lenged by several researchers. Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005)
argue that stronger imitation may lead to more innovation because incum-
bents suffer more if they do not innovate. Helpman (1993) has shown how, by
affecting the North-South division of labor, weak IPR protection in the South
can improve world welfare. Imitation allows southern firms to concentrate on
production using northern technologies, which in turn allows northern firms to
concentrate on innovation. Bessen and Maskin (2007) stress the importance
of market failure in understanding the role of IPR enforcement. They demon-
strate that if technologies display externalities which cannot be internalized
through contracts, strong IPR protection can slow down rather than facilitate
technological progress. Finally, Che et al. (2009) have shown that, when a
country suffers from some forms of market failure, weak IPR enforcement al-
lows copycats to fill market vacancies left by multinationals. The increased
social surplus can then be shared by the multinationals, which ultimately leads
to more innovation.
2
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 27
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated | 10.248.254.158
Download Date | 8/14/14 12:20 AM
This study arrives at the same conclusion–that imitation may stimulate
innovation–but for a different reason: When imitation is strong, the innovator
derives a smaller benefit from its own cost reduction, but it also suffers less
damage from imitators’ cost reductions. The second effect may dominate so
that the incentive to innovate is enhanced. This explanation is related to, but
distinct from, that developed by Aghion et al. (1997), Aghion et al. (2001) and
Aghion et al. (2005), for it is demonstrated in a typical industrial organization
setting. The conclusion has a clear policy implication: Weak IPR protection
may not only increase ex post social surplus by encouraging product market
competition, but it may also increase ex ante social surplus by encouraging
innovation.
In this study, technology imitation was modeled as a free transfer of part of
the innovator’s technology to non-innovators. Such a setting is similar to that
adopted in industrial organization studies of R&D cooperation (D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988). Nevertheless, the objective of this study and the driving
force behind the conclusions were both very different. The connection of this
study to the literature as well as the robustness of the findings will be discussed
in the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
A set, N , of firms produce a homogenous product and compete à la Cournot.
Demand is linear: p = a − bQ with Q =
P
i∈N qi and a, b > 0. Following
Perry and Porter (1985) and McAfee and Williams (1992), I assume that
firm i’s production cost is Ci = C(qi, ki) ≡ q
2
i
2ki
, where qi is the production
quantity and ki measures the firm’s technology level (or knowledge capital).
Innovation is modeled as an improvement in ki. Unlike most models in growth
and R&D cooperation that assume constant marginal costs, this one assumes
that marginal costs increase with production quantity. Such a cost structure
is a natural way to model technology innovation that affects production costs
because it can be derived as a short-run cost from a Cobb-Douglas production
function with a variable input such as labor and a fixed input in the form of
technology represented by ki.1 In fact, the analysis will show that the results
still hold when marginal costs are constant with respect to quantity.
1Suppose that all firms possess the same constant-returns-to-scale production function
q = (kl)
1
2 , in which k is technology (or alternatively knowledge capital) as an input, and l
is labor input. In the short run when its technology is fixed at ki, firm i’s variable cost is
Ci ≡ minli wli subject to qi = (kili)
1
2 , in which w is the wage rate. The minimum cost is
w
ki
q2i . If w =
1
2 , the assumed cost function obtains.
3
Zhou: Innovation, Imitation and Competition
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated | 10.248.254.158
Download Date | 8/14/14 12:20 AM
Given the vector of technologies, k ≡ {ki}i∈N , the Cournot equilibrium
can be derived as follows (see McAfee and Williams, 1992). Let gi = bki1+bki and
G =
P
i∈N gi. Thus, gi represents the (competitive) strength of firm i. It is
increasing and concave in i’s technology level, ki, with limki→∞ gi = 1. Firm
i’s Cournot profit is then
πi =
a2gi(1 + gi)
2b(1 +G)2
.
It is evident that normalizing a ≡ 1 does not entail any loss of generality.
Furthermore, because b is a fixed coefficient in πi and it always appears to-
gether with ki in gi, we can also normalize b ≡ 1 by appropriately choosing the
measurement unit of ki. Note that ∂πi∂gi > 0 while
∂πi
∂gj
< 0 for j 6= i. That is, a
firm’s profit increases with its own strength and decreases with its competitors’
strengths.
N consists of n+ 1 firms. One of them is the innovator, and all the other
n (n ≥ 0) firms are imitators. For any level of the innovator’s technology, k,
assume each of the imitators obtains a fraction, β, of the technology for free.
The coefficient β ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of technology imitation, while n
measures the degree of competition.2 There is no time delay in imitation, so
if an innovation reduces the innovator’s cost, the costs of all its competitors
are also reduced instantly.
Given k, the innovator’s profit in the product market is
π(k) =
g(1 + g)
2(1 + g + nh)2
,
where g = g(k) = k
1+k is the innovator’s strength, and h = h(β, k) =
βk
1+βk is
each imitator’s strength.
The innovation game is played as follows. The innovator chooses its tech-
nology level k at cost r(k), with r0(·) ≥ 0, r0(0) = 0 and r00(·) ≥ 0. The chosen
technology is immediately imitated by the n imitators, after which all the n+1
firms play a Cournot game in the product market. The innovator therefore
solves the following problem:
max
k≥0
π(k)− r(k).
The optimal level of technology, k∗, is solved from the first-order condition:
π0(k∗)− r0(k∗) = 0,
2In the growth literature, the intensity of competition is usually measured by the sub-
stitutability between two firms’ products, which is a taste parameter (Aghion et al., 2001).
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as the second-order condition is always satisfied: π00(k) < 0 whenever π0(k) ≥
0, while r00(·) ≥ 0. Note that π0(0) = 1
2
so π0(0)−r0(0) > 0, and limk→∞ π0(k) =
0. As a result, k∗ exists and is unique.
Denote π(k) by π(g(k), h(β, k), n). Then,
π0(k) ≡ dπ
dk
=
∂π
∂g
g0(k) +
∂π
∂h
∂h
∂k
.
It has been noted above that ∂π∂g > 0 and
∂π
∂h < 0, while g
0(k) = 1
(1+k)2 > 0 and
∂h
∂k =
β
(1+βk)2 > 0. Thus, the innovator faces the following tradeoff in choosing
its technology level. On one hand, innovation reduces its own cost and should
therefore increase its profit. This is the direct effect (when the imitators’
costs are fixed), which is captured by the term ∂π∂g g
0(k), which is positive. On
the other hand, imitation means the innovator’s technology also reduces its
competitors’ costs, which tends to decrease the innovator’s profit. This is the
indirect effect, which is captured by the term ∂π∂h
∂h
∂k , which is negative. Because
the two effects work in opposition, the net effect depends on the parameter
values.
Denote π0(k) by v. Given the expression for π(k),
v =
∂π
∂g
g0(k) +
∂π
∂h
∂h
∂k
=
(1 + g) + nh(1 + 2g)
2(1 + g + nh)2
1
(1 + k)2
− ng(1 + g)
(1 + g + nh)3
β
(1 + βk)2
=
(1 + βk) {nβk[(k + 3k2)β − (4k2 + 3k + 1)] + (1 + βk)2(1 + 2k)}
2 [(1 + βk)(1 + 2k) + nβk(1 + k)]3
.
Note that, for a given β and k, v ≥ 0 if and only if n ≤ n1, where
n1 ≡
(1 + 2k)(1 + βk)2
βk[(4− 3β)k2 + (3− β)k + 1] > 0.
Also note that k should be endogenous, but whenever v(k∗) ≥ 0, there is an
r(k) function that yields the particular k∗ as the k that is optimally chosen.
Thus, n ≤ n1 is a necessary condition at the optimal k∗ because v(k∗) ≥ 0
must be satisfied.
3 How Imitation Affects Innovation
We are interested in how imitation affects the innovator’s optimal choice of
technology, i.e., how β affects k∗. The optimal technology k∗ is determined
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from the first-order condition: v(k∗(β, n), β, n) − r0(k∗(β, n)) = 0. Taking
derivative with respect to β yields
¡
∂v
∂k − r00
¢
∂k∗
∂β +
∂v
∂β = 0. Because
∂v
∂k−r00 < 0
(the second-order condition), the sign of ∂k
∗
∂β is the same as the sign of
∂v
∂β .
To determine the impact of β, we are interested in the sign of ∂v∂β when
v ≥ 0. It has already been established that v ≥ 0 if and only if n ≤ n1.
Similarly, ∂v∂β ≥ 0 if and only if n ≥ n2, where
n2 ≡
(1 + 2k)(1 + βk)[−2βk3 + (2− 3β)k2 + 3k + 2]
βk(1 + k)(2βk3 + 4k2 + 3k + 1)
.
When β ≥ 4k2+3k+1k(4k2+9k+3) , n1 ≥ n2 and therefore the set [n2, n1] is not empty.
Figure 1 shows v as a function of β when n = 1 and k = 3. It is clear that
v decreases with β when β is small, but increases with β when β is large.
Thus, when imitation is weak, imitation dampens innovation; when imitation
is strong and competition moderate, imitation may stimulate innovation.
v
ß
Figure 1: v as a function of β (n = 1, k = 3)
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The intuition works as follows. Re-write v as
v =
direct effectz }| {
∂π
∂g
(+)
(g(k), h(β, k))g0(k)
(+)
+
indirect effectz }| {
∂π
∂h
(−)
(g(k), h(β, k))
∂h
∂k
(+)
(β, k)
to highlight how β affects various terms in the expression. Recall that v is
the innovator’s marginal benefit of technology. It consists of two effects. The
first term represents the direct effect, which is the benefit of innovation when
imitators’ costs are fixed. The second term is the indirect effect, which is the
damage to the innovator arising from the reduction in the imitators’ costs. For
the impact of β on k∗, take the derivative with respect to β:
∂v
∂β
=
direct effectz }| {
∂2π
∂g∂h
(−)
∂h
∂β
(+)
g0(k)
(+)
+
indirect effectz }| {
∂2π
∂h2
(+)
∂h
∂β
(+)
∂h
∂k
(+)
+
∂π
∂h
(−)
∂2h
∂k∂β
(?)
.
The first term in the expression describes how β affects the direct effect.
It is related to ∂
2π
∂g∂h = −
n[1−g2+nh(1+2g)]
(1+g+nh)4 < 0. When imitators are stronger (h
is larger), they compete more aggressively in the product market. As a result,
the residual demand faced by the innovator is smaller, reducing his benefit
from the technology. So stronger imitation weakens the direct effect.
The second and third terms in the expression for ∂v∂β capture how β affects
the indirect effect, and the impact is reflected in how the imitators’ strengths
damage the innovator (the second term) and how technology strengthens the
imitators (the third term). For the second term, note that ∂
2π
∂h2 =
3g(1+g)n2
(1+g+nh)4 > 0,
which means that although the imitators’ strengths reduce the innovator’s
profit (∂π∂h < 0), they do so at a diminishing rate. When imitation is stronger,
h is higher, so the negative impact on the innovator’s profit diminishes. For the
third term, ∂
2h
∂k∂β =
1−βk
(1+βk)3 , which can be positive or negative depending on the
value of βk. Note that h = βk
1+βk is the strength of each imitator, and
∂h
∂k > 0
measures how the innovator’s technology enhances him. When the imitator’s
current level of technology (βk) is low, the enhancement increases with β;
when the imitator’s technology is already high, the enhancement decreases
with β. To see the net effect, note that the second term is proportional to βk.
So when βk is very small, the second term is close to zero while the third term
is negative. As a result, stronger imitation exacerbates the indirect effect.
Conversely, when βk is large, the terms reinforce each other, and stronger
imitation lessens the indirect effect.
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In summary, β affects an innovator’s choice of technology through both
direct and indirect effects. A larger β always weakens the direct effect, and it
weakens the indirect effect when β is high. It is possible that the impact on the
indirect effect dominates so that the net benefit of innovation increases when
imitation is strong, leading to a higher level of technology. This happens when
competition is neither too strong nor too weak. When competition is strong
(i.e., n is large), the marginal benefit of technology is negative. There are so
many competitors waiting to imitate the technology that a wise innovator will
refuse to adopt any technology even if it is free. When competition is weak
(i.e., n is small), the impact of β on the direct effect dominates, so stronger
imitation leads to lower levels of technology.
4 How Competition Affects Innovation
For the impact of competition on innovation, i.e., how n affects k∗, the same
method can be applied to show that the sign of ∂k
∗
∂n is the same as the sign
of ∂v∂n . It has been explained that v ≥ 0 if and only if n ≤ n1. It can also be
shown that ∂v∂n ≥ 0 if and only if n ≥ n3, where
n3 ≡
(1 + 2k)(1 + βk)[2k2 + (3 + β)k + 2]
βk[(4− 3β)k2 + (3− β)k + 1] .
It is straightforward to verify that n1 < n3. Therefore, whenever v > 0,
∂v
∂n < 0. That is, competition always dampens innovation. A typical graph of
v as a function of n is shown in Figure 2.
To understand the intuition, re-write v as
v =
∂π
∂g
(g(k), h(k), n)g0(k) +
∂π
∂h
(g(k), h(k), n)
∂h
∂k
(k).
Then
∂v
∂n
=
∂2π
∂g∂n
(−)
g0(k)
(+)
+
∂2π
∂h∂n
(?)
∂h
∂k
(+)
.
The first term above captures the direct effect. ∂π∂g is the innovator’s marginal
benefit from its own strength. When there is more competition (n is larger),
the marginal benefit becomes smaller: ∂
2π
∂g∂n = −
h[1−g2+nh(1+2g)]
(1+g+nh)4 < 0. The
second term captures the indirect effect. ∂π∂h measures how much the innovator
suffers from the competition from imitators, and ∂
2π
∂h∂n =
g(1+g)(2nh−1−g)
(1+g+nh)4 can be
either positive or negative depending on n. When n is small, the innovator
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vn
Figure 2: v as a function of n (β = 1
2
, k = 3)
sustains a large share of the competitive pressure, so increased competition
(due to a larger n) means the innovator suffers much of it. When n is large,
however, the competition falls mainly on the imitators themselves and the
innovator feels increased competition less.
So the direct effect (the innovator benefits from the technology through the
drop in its own cost) is always weakened by increased competition, but the
indirect effect (the innovator’s reduced profits from the drop in its competi-
tors’ costs) may be either strengthened or weakened depending on the initial
level of competition. In the context assumed here, the introduction of new
technology indicates that competition must not be very strong, otherwise the
innovator would not have chosen to implement new technology. It turns out
that whenever a new technology is developed, the competition must have been
so weak (i.e., n is small enough) that the incentive to innovate is reduced by
increased competition. As a result, the innovator will choose a lower level of
technology when competition intensifies.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This analysis has shown that imitation may stimulate rather than dampen
innovation. When imitation is easy, an innovator derives less benefit from its
own cost reductions, but it may also suffer less damage from imitators’ cost
reductions. When imitation is strong and competition moderate, the second
effect may dominate so that the marginal benefits from technology increases
when imitation becomes stronger, leading to a higher level of technology.
Because the degree of imitation can be affected in part by the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights (IPR), the conclusion has implications for
optimal IPR policy. Conventional wisdom advocates strong IPR protection
because imitation is thought to damage innovation. Such thinking equates the
innovator’s profit with the incentive to innovate. As Arrow (1962) and Aghion
et al. (1997) have pointed out and as has been shown in this analysis, the two
can be very different. The innovator may suffer from stronger imitation, and
yet at the same time the incentive to innovate may become stronger rather
than weaker. Thus, if the government’s goal is to stimulate innovation,3 Fig-
ure 1 suggests that the government should strengthen IPR protection when
it is already strong. But, if IPR protection is weak, a government seeking to
encourage innovation should weaken it further.
Of course, for such an IPR policy to be taken seriously, more thorough
investigations are needed. This model is highly specific and merely points
out a possibility. It may be useful, though, to ponder for a moment the
robustness of the conclusions. In this model, there was only one innovator, all
imitators were identical, imitation was instantaneous and free, and marginal
costs were assumed increasing. None of these assumptions is crucial. If there
were more than one innovator, the basic forces would still act as long as the
firms fall into two distinctive groups: innovators and imitators. The symmetry
of imitators is obviously a simplifying assumption; all the expressions can easily
be modified to accommodate asymmetric imitators. Similarly, imitation costs
can be incorporated into the model without changing the qualitative results.
As for the possibility of a time delay in imitation, note that imitation
stimulates innovation when imitation weakens the indirect effect more than
it weakens the direct effect. If imitation takes time, the direct effect is still
instantaneous, but the indirect effect will not be felt immediately. This would
tend to reduce the instantaneous marginal benefit of technology, but it is
3If the goal is dynamic social welfare combining ex post welfare from the product market
and ex ante welfare from innovation, even weaker protection of IPR is called for, as the
product market welfare decreases unambiguously with the degree of protection: a larger β
always increases product market welfare at any given level of the innovator’s technology.
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unlikely that the forces identified in this analysis would disappear completely.
In a dynamic model, although the marginal benefits of technology may be
reduced at first, they may rise over time when imitation picks up strength.
It is unclear how a time delay in imitation would alter the overall technology
level. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the possibility, in a standard
industrial organization setting, that imitation may stimulate innovation, and
to identify the driving force of the stimulus. Such a static model with its
comparative static results should serve as the first step in understanding the
relationship between imitation and innovation in a dynamic and more complete
model.
In almost all industrial organization and growth models of R&D and in-
novation, marginal costs are assumed to be constant. It is therefore useful to
consider whether the conclusions of this study still hold when marginal costs
are constant. Assume that the innovator’s marginal cost is ck while an imita-
tor’s marginal cost is cβk , where c is a constant. For demand p = a− bQ, the
innovator’s Cournot profit π = 1b
³
a+ ck+
nc
βk
n+2 −
c
k
´2
. As previously, v ≡ ∂π∂k ≥ 0
if and only if n ≤ n1 ≡ β1−β ,
∂v
∂β ≥ 0 if and only if n ≤ n2 ≡
β
2(1−β)
¡
2− ack
¢
,
and ∂v∂n ≥ 0 if and only if n ≤ n3 ≡
2β
1−β
a
c k+β−2
a
c βk+2β−4
. It turns out that n1 > n2,
but n1 < n3. Thus, exactly the same conclusion is reached: While competi-
tion dampens innovation, imitation stimulates innovation when competition is
moderate. So, if anything, assuming constant marginal costs makes the con-
clusion even stronger: For imitation to be conducive to innovation, imitation
does not have to be strong to begin with. The conclusion holds for any level
of imitation as long as competition is neither too strong nor too weak.
Although the assumption of increasing marginal costs is not crucial to the
conclusions, it has several advantages over the setting in which marginal costs
are constant. With the natural interpretation of k as knowledge, the cost
structure is particularly suitable for studying innovation. Unlike in the case
of constant marginal cost, there is no need to assume boundary conditions
about how much knowledge a firm may possess.4 With knowledge as a stock,
innovation as a flow, and imitation as delivering a fraction of the innovator’s
knowledge for free,5 the model can easily be extended to study the dynamics
4Since cost cannot be negative, there must either be an upper limit to the total amount
of innovation, or the reduced cost must be non-linear and asymptotically approaching zero
or some positive level.
5In this model, imitation yields a fraction of the stock (of knowledge), while Mookherjee
and Ray (1991) considered diffusion as yielding a fraction of the flow (of cost reduction).
That is why Mookherjee and Ray need dynamics (tomorrow’s cost is a reduction of today’s
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of the accumulation, diffusion and erosion (i.e., forgetting) of knowledge.
This enquiry is closely related to industrial organization studies of R&D
cooperation, which were pioneered by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) fol-
lowed by Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), and Ziss (1994), to name
just a few. These scholars investigate whether the government should allow
R&D cooperation between competing firms when their R&D investments spill
over to one another. A common assumption in these studies (D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) and many others) has been that a firm’s investment
reduces not only its own cost, but also its competitors’ costs by a smaller
amount, and that firms play a two-stage game in which R&D investment is
followed by product market competition. Such a setting is almost identical to
that assumed in this study. Spillover and imitation are just different names for
the phenomenon whereby a firm obtains a fraction of its competitors’ R&D
output for free. One difference is that spillover is usually reciprocal while
imitation is one-directional, but such a difference is not essential.6 More im-
portant differences lie in the motivation of the studies and forces driving the
conclusions. This study was interested in how strongly to enforce IPR (i.e., to
choose a value of β that would maximize the amount of innovation or social
welfare), while studies of R&D cooperation have been interested in whether or
not cooperation should be allowed (a binary choice for any given β, which is
fixed regardless of cooperation). In this analysis, the basic tradeoff is between
the direct and indirect effects. In R&D cooperation, the tradeoff (for social
welfare) is the following: because of the R&D spillover, individual firms tend
to underinvest in technology; because of competition in the product market,
firms tend to overinvest in technology (part of the benefit of a firm’s cost re-
duction comes from cannibalizing its competitors, so when their joint profit is
considered, the firm’s investment in R&D should be reduced).
Other industrial organization studies of R&D have focused on the interac-
tion between market structure and research activities. Yi (1999) studied the
incentive to innovate in a Cournot oligopoly and, as in this analysis, found
that the incentive decreases with the number of firms. Yi used constant rather
than increasing marginal cost. More importantly, Yi studied the effect of
competition on innovation, while this study focused primarily on the effects of
cost, which in turn is a reduction of yesterday’s cost) while this analysis does not.
6For studying imitation, it is natural to assume that a firm is either an innovator or
an imitator, i.e., the flow of technology is one directional. For R&D spillover, although the
symmetric case is the simplest possible and is used by almost all the models, that assumption
is not necessary. It is easy to imagine a setting in which spillover is asymmetric so that
the flow of technology is one directional. Nevertheless, the driving forces identified in those
studies continue to operate, and their major conclusions are unlikely to change.
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imitation.
Mookherjee and Ray (1991) studied technology diffusion with a single in-
novator and a competitive fringe and demonstrated that faster diffusion may
speed up the adoption of innovations. In this analysis, by contrast, imita-
tion was assumed to take place instantly, while Mookherjee and Ray assumed
that diffusion takes time. If their diffusion were instant, no innovation would
ever be adopted. Also, this analysis worked with quantity competition, while
Mookherjee and Ray used price competition. They actually showed that the
opposite conclusion is obtained if firms compete in quantity.
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